A government can grant a railway concession without stepping out of the railway business. The useful question is what it retains, what it delegates and how those arrangements become a service that people and businesses can use.

In Part 2, we examined the business behind the Angolan railway. This week, we cross into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the announced Dilolo–Sakania concession combines private operating responsibilities with state participation and retained railway rights (DRC Presidency).

On 26 August 2026, the DRC and Mota-Engil Africa signed a 30-year concession for the Dilolo–Sakania railway, linking the Angolan and Zambian borders through the Congolese mining region (Mota-Engil announcement). The presidency describes rehabilitation, modernization, extension, operation and maintenance, with infrastructure to transfer to the state at the end under the contract's provisions (DRC Presidency).

That is different from appointing a contractor to complete works and leave. My reading is that the concession brings rehabilitation and long-term service responsibilities into the same arrangement. The delivery test should therefore extend beyond kilometres repaired to the reliability and maintainability of the resulting railway.

Nor is this a railway starting from zero. Lobito Atlantic Railway already describes Congolese service under a track-access agreement with SNCC, the state railway company, including a commitment to upgrade the Dilolo–Kolwezi section (operator's network description). How existing arrangements transition into the new concession remains a question to verify, not a reason to describe current services as nonexistent.

The presidency says the DRC will hold at least 10% of the project company and receive a concession fee equivalent to 7.5% of annual gross turnover (announced terms). Those percentages must not be added together: they apply to different things.

Equity is an ownership interest, not an automatic annual payment. To understand its value, I would want to see how the state's shares are funded, its voting and information rights, future capital obligations and the conditions for distributions. The announcement does not settle those questions.

The concession fee is a separate revenue-linked entitlement. A fee calculated on gross turnover is not the same as a dividend calculated from distributable earnings. The precise revenue definition, payment timetable, audit rights and remedies would matter to assessing what the state can actually collect.

For me, the public-interest question is not simply whether the state has a stake. It is whether each retained right can be monitored and enforced, and whether the business can meet its obligations while maintaining the railway.

The announced DRC framework: equity, a turnover-based fee, concessionaire responsibilities and operating rights are distinct. This is a guide to the government's account, not an audit of the signed agreement.

Graphic source: DRC Presidency, 26 August 2026.

View the full-size DRC deal guide

According to the presidency, the concessionaire assumes financing and traffic risks without a sovereign guarantee, operating subsidy or minimum-revenue guarantee at the state's expense (DRC Presidency). These are the government's published terms, not an independent review of the executed agreement.

Traffic risk concerns whether enough paying business materializes. Assigning it to the concessionaire does not, by itself, demonstrate that the state has no other obligations or potential liabilities. I would still examine termination provisions, public-interface responsibilities, dispute mechanisms and the treatment of events outside either party's control.

The important discipline is to read a risk allocation narrowly. “No minimum-revenue guarantee” is a specific statement; “no risk to the country” would be a much larger, unsupported claim.

SNCC is to retain exclusive passenger-transport rights and its right to carry freight, while qualified operators are to have transparent, equitable and non-discriminatory access (announced operating framework). That distinction matters: a concession to manage infrastructure is not automatically an exclusive right to run every train.

From the owner's side, I would test how those rights work on an ordinary operating day. Who allocates train paths? What are the access charges? How are passenger services and freight movements coordinated during maintenance? Who resolves competing demands for capacity?

Angola and the DRC also announced an intended joint mechanism for operational harmonization, maintenance coordination, tariff transparency and improvements at the Dilolo–Luau crossing (DRC Presidency). I would judge that coordination by dependable end-to-end journeys, not by separate national promises.

The presidency cites nearly $1.258 billion of indicative investment, while Mota-Engil expects approximately $1.8 billion over the concession period; the reviewed announcements do not reconcile that difference (DRC Presidency, Mota-Engil).

DFC's December 2025 announcement described a letter of interest under which the project might seek up to $1 billion following full review (DFC announcement). That dated announcement is not, by itself, evidence of financial close or today's available construction cash. Equally, the Angolan financial close covered in Part 2 concerns a separate borrower and project scope (AFC announcement).

I would not subtract the prospective loan from either estimate and label the result a verified funding gap. The useful next evidence is the DRC financing package, its conditions, the rehabilitation programme and the milestones that release money for delivery.

I would assess three outcomes separately: a railway that performs; state entitlements that are transparent and enforceable; and access that works for users beyond the concessionaire. A shareholding cannot substitute for service quality, and a concession fee cannot substitute for useful connectivity.

That is the distinction I want practitioners to take from the Congolese agreement. The signature creates a framework; its value must be demonstrated through financing, execution and operating results. The DRC's opportunity is not just to retain a percentage, but to make its retained rights count.

Issue #10 · The Lobito Series, Part 4 of 5: Zambia's proposed connection. We will examine what it takes to turn a new route into a financeable, deliverable railway, rather than treating it as another completed piece of the corridor.

Passionate about African infrastructure. We will build — sooner or later. — Magnus

Africa Infrastructure Brief is a weekly Sunday newsletter on African infrastructure projects, deals and delivery. Written by Magnus, an owner-side infrastructure project management consultant with 20 years of experience across energy, marine and industrial projects in Africa and North America. Subscribe to Africa Infrastructure Brief.